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Abstract
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare
economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions
has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or di-
visible, it is impossible to achieve envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency
ex post even in the case of two people and two items. In contrast,
in this work, we prove that, for any cardinal utility functions (includ-
ing complementary utilities for example) and for any number of items
and players, there always exists an ex ante mixed allocation which is
envy-free and Pareto Efficient, assuming the allowable assignments are
closed under swaps, i.e. if given a legal assignment, swapping any two
players allocations produces another legal assignment. The problem
remains open in the divisible case.
1 Introduction
Efficiency and fairness are two important goals in welfare economics. Pareto
Efficiency and envy-freeness are the foremost notions of, respectively, effi-
ciency and fairness for the allocation problem. A given allocation is Pareto
Efficient if there is no other allocation in which no one loses and at least
one person gains, and it is envy-free if no person can gain by exchanging her
bundle with someone else’s.
The question of whether there exists an allocation that is both Pareto
Efficient and envy-free has been studied for a long time. Unfortunately, for
general utility functions, in both the divisible and indivisible cases, solutions
that are simultaneously Pareto Efficient and envy-free cannot be ensured.
In the indivisible case, in which items cannot be split, allocating one item
among two people who both value the item will never be envy-free and, in
the divisible case, there is a well-known example which comprises two items
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and two players such that there is no simultaneously Pareto Efficient and
envy-free allocation.
However, in these counter-examples, the allocations are deterministic.
In other words, there is no randomness. Randomness is often the enabler
for existence; for instance, the existence of a Nash equilibrium. So, for the
allocation problem, what happens if we consider a mixed allocation instead
of a pure allocation? Does there exist a mixed Pareto Efficient and envy-free
allocation?
In this paper, we focus on the indivisible case, and our answer is YES.
We prove that, for any cardinal utility functions and for any number of items
and players, there always exists an ex ante mixed allocation which is envy-
free and Pareto Efficient, assuming the allowable assignments are swappable.
An allocation set is swappable if the allocation that results from any single
pair of players exchanging their allocated bundles is also allowable. Clearly,
the allocation set that can allocate any subset of items to any player is
swappable.
Our approach is to construct a mapping from the space of mixed alloca-
tions and weight vectors to itself. We then apply the Kakutani fixed-point
theorem [19] to obtain a fixed point. Finally, we prove that the fixed point
corresponds to a mixed Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocation. The proof
is inspired by [27, 2, 31].
2 Related Work
A detailed survey on fairness and further background can be found in [6, 7,
24].
Research on fair allocation research dates back to at least [26]. A fair
allocation is defined as a Pareto Efficient allocation in which everyone prefers
their own bundle to other players’ bundles, which is exactly the notion of
envy-freeness proposed in [17].
The existence of Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations has been stud-
ied in both the divisible and indivisible cases.
When items are divisible, previous work [29, 27, 15, 28, 30] showed that
Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations exist under a variety of assump-
tions, including that utility functions are strictly monotone, continuous,
or convex. In contrast, Vohra [30] showed that when the economy has
increasing-marginal-returns, there exist cases such that no Pareto Efficient
and envy-free allocation exists. Also, Maniquet [23] gave an example with
two items and three players for which there is no Pareto Efficient and envy-
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free allocation.
In the indivisible setting, for the case of mixed allocations, Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [5] introduced the Probabilistic Serial mechanism and showed
this new mechanism results in an ordinally efficient expected matching
which is envy-free in their setting. Ordinal efficiency is a notion which
is slightly weaker than Pareto Efficiency. Budish et al. [9] gave a Pareto
Efficient and envy-free allocation when the allocation constraints satisfy a
bihierarchy assumption which applies to multi-item allocation problems with
possibly non-linear utility functions.
For the deterministic case, because of the simple counter-example men-
tioned above, researchers have proposed many other notions of fairness. The
two most closely related notions are EF1 (envy free up to one good) [8] and
EFX (envy free up to any good) [10]. Recall that the idea in the defini-
tion of envy-freeness is that each player will compare their bundle to those
of the other players. These alternate notions also have players compare
their bundle to the other players’ bundles, but in EF1, players delete their
favorite item from the other bundle before doing the comparison, and in
EFX, players will not envy another bundle after deleting their least favorite
item. Lipton et al. [22] showed that an EF1 allocation always exists. For
the EFX allocation, Plaut and Roughgarden [25] showed that in some sit-
uations (utility functions are identical or additive) existence is guaranteed,
while for general utility functions, there exist examples such that no EFX
allocation is Pareto Efficient.
In addition, Dickerson et al. [16] showed that if the number of items is
at least a logarithmic factor larger than the number of players, then with
high probability, an envy free allocation exists.
Other fairness notions include Nash Social Welfare [10, 13, 12], max-min
fairness [20], and CEEI [29].
There has been considerable recent work [13, 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 18, 21] on
the computational complexity of computing the Nash Social Welfare, both
exactly and approximately, for divisible and indivisible items.
3 Notations and Result
There are m items and n players. Each player have a positive utility func-
tion ui(xi) on each subset xi ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. And there are k alloca-
tions, A(1), A(2), · · · , A(k). Allocation A(j) allocates A
(j)
i to player i, where
A
(j)
i ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,m} and A
(j)
i ∩A
(j)
i′ = ∅ for any i and i
′.
We say the allocation set is swappable if and only if for any allocation A(l)
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and any pair i¯ and i˜, there exists one allocation A(l
′) such that A
(l)
i = A
(l′)
i
for any i 6= {¯i, i˜}, A
(l)
i¯
= A
(l′)
i˜
and A
(l)
i˜
= A
(l′)
i¯
.
We define a mixed allocation to be a probability distribution on alloca-
tion: p = (p1, p2, · · · , pk) ∈ P such that
∑
j pj = 1 and pj ≥ 0 for any j.
Given p, the expected utility for player i is
∑
j pjui(A
j
i ).
A mixed allocation p is Pareto Efficient (PE) if there doesn’t exist an-
other mixed allocation p′ such that for all i,
∑
j p
′
jui(A
(j)
i ) ≥
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i )
and there exist one i such that this inequality is strict.
A mixed allocation p is Envy Free (EF) if for every pair i and i′ of
players,
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i ) ≥
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i′ ).
Theorem 3.1. If the allocation set is swappable, then there exists a Pareto
Efficient and Envy Free mixed allocation.
4 Proof
WLOG, we assume that 1 ≤ ui(xi) ≤ 2 for all i and xi. We will use a fixed
point argument. To this end, we construct a mapping from P ×W to itself.
Here, P is the set of mixed allocations and W is the set of weighted vector
{w = (w1, w2, · · · , wn)|
∑
iwi = 1 and wi ≥ ǫ}. We will specify ǫ later. Now
we construct a mapping from (p,w) to (P(w),̟(p,w)), where P(w) is a
subset of P and ̟(p,w) ∈W .
P(w) = {p′|p′ ∈ P and p′ ∈ argmax
∑
i
wi
∑
j
p′jui(A
(j)
i )};
̟(p,w) = projW (ν(p,w));
νi(p,w) = wi +
maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
)
∑
i′ maxi¯
∑
j pjui′(A
(j)
i¯
)
−
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i )
∑
i′
∑
j pjui′(A
(j)
i′ )
.
Lemma 4.1. There exists a fixed point, (p∗,w∗), such that p∗ ∈ P(w∗)
and ̟(p∗,w∗) = w∗.
We prove this via the following three claims.
Claim 4.2. Let A(w) = {j|A(j) maximizes
∑
iwiui(A
(j)
i ) over all allocations}.
Then, P(w) is a simplex on A(w), that for any p′′ ∈ P(w), p′′j > 0 only if
j ∈ A(w) (and, of course
∑
j p
′′
j = 1 and p
′′
j ≥ 0).
Proof of Claim 4.2. It’s not hard to see that in the definition of P(w), we
can rewrite
∑
iwi
∑
j p
′
jui(A
(j)
i ) as
∑
j p
′
j
∑
iwiui(A
(j)
i ). So any probability
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p′j > 0 on an allocation A
(j) that does not maximize
∑
iwiui(A
(j)
i ) will
contradict the definition of P(w).
Claim 4.3. Give a mixed allocation p′ ∈ P , the set of w such that p′ ∈
P(w) is a convex closed set.
Proof of Claim 4.3. The set of w such that p′ ∈ P(w) can be written as
a linear program: for any j and j′ such that pj > 0,
∑
iwiui(A
(j)
i ) ≥∑
i wiui(A
(j′)
i ).
Claim 4.4. For any series (w(t),p(t)) with limt→∞w
(t) = w and limt→∞ p
(t) =
p, if for every t, p(t) ∈ P(wt), then p ∈ P(w).
Proof of Claim 4.4. Consider the set S = {j|pj > 0}. Since the dimension
of p, which is the number of allocations, is finite, there must exist a t′ such
that p
(t)
j > 0 for all j ∈ S and all t ≥ t
′. Consider the set W of w such
that A(j) maximizes
∑
i wiui(A
(j)
i ) for all j ∈ S. Since p
(t) ∈ P(w(t)),
p(t) ∈ argmax
∑
j p
(t)
j
∑
i w
(t)
i ui(A
(j)
i ). This implies w
(t) ∈ W for any t ≥ t′.
Furthermore, W is convex and closed by Claim 4.3, which implies w ∈ W.
By Claim 4.2, p ∈ P(w).
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The result follows by using the Kakutani fixed-point
theorem.
It is not hard to see p∗ is a Pareto Efficient allocation.
Claim 4.5. p∗ is a Pareto Efficient allocation.
Proof. Note that the fact that p∗ ∈ P(w∗) means p∗ maximizes
∑
iw
∗
i
∑
j p
∗
jui(A
(j)
i ).
So, there cannot be another p such that for every i,
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i ) ≥
∑
j p
∗
jui(A
(j)
i ),
with the inequality being strict for some i.
The following two lemmas prove the theorem.
Lemma 4.6. If ν(p∗,w∗) ∈W , then p∗ is a Pareto Efficient and envy free
allocation.
Lemma 4.7. if ν(p∗,w∗) is not in W , then w∗ 6= ̟(p∗,w∗).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The theorem follows from Lemmas 4.6, 4.7 and 4.1.
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Next, we start to prove Lemma 4.6. We first construct an envy graph
(V,E) based on p∗. V is the set of players and (i, i′) ∈ E if and only if i
envies i′, which means
∑
j p
∗
jui(A
(j)
i ) <
∑
j p
∗
jui(A
(j)
i′ ).
Claim 4.8. Let p∗ be a Pareto Efficient mixed allocation. The corresponding
envy graph is acyclic.
Proof of Claim 4.8. If the graph has a cycle, then we can improve everyone’s
utility functions in this cycle by exchanging the allocations along the cycle,
contradicting Pareto Efficiency.
Given the Pareto Efficient mixed allocation p∗, we define the set of envy
free players to be I(p∗) = {i|player i does not envy j for all j}.
Claim 4.9. Suppose p∗be a Pareto Efficient mixed allocation. Then I(p∗)
is not empty.
Proof of Claim 4.9. This follows from the fact that the graph is acyclic.
Claim 4.10. Let p∗ be a Pareto Efficient mixed allocation. Then, for any
i in I(p∗),
maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
)
∑
i′ maxi¯
∑
j pjui′(A
(j)
i¯
)
≤
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i )
∑
i′
∑
j pjui′(A
(j)
i′ )
,
and equality holds if and only if p∗ is envy free.
Proof of Claim 4.10. The inequality follows from the following two facts:
• maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
) ≥
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i );
• for any i ∈ I(p∗), maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
) =
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i ).
Equality holds if and only if for all players, maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
) =
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i )
and thus no one envies anyone else.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. It is not hard to see that if ν(p∗,w∗) ∈ W and w∗ is
a fixed point, then w∗ = ̟(p∗,w∗) = ν(p∗,w∗), and
maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
)
∑
i′ maxi¯
∑
j pjui′ (A
(j)
i¯
)
=
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i
)
∑
i′
∑
j pjui′ (A
(j)
i′
)
. In additional, by Claim 4.5, p∗ is a Pareto Efficient allo-
cation and so from Claim 4.10, p∗ is envy free.
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Next, we will show Lemma 4.7, namely that if ν(p∗,w∗) is not in W ,
then w∗ 6= ̟(p∗,w∗). We will use the following claims.
Claim 4.11. ̟(p∗,w∗) ≤ max{ν(p∗,w∗), ǫ}.
Proof of Claim 4.11. For simplicity, let x∗ = ̟(p∗,w∗) and y∗ = ν(p∗,w∗).
Then x∗ = projW y
∗ means x∗ is the result of the following optimization pro-
gram: minx
1
2‖x−y
∗‖2 such that x ∈W . Note thatW = {(w1, · · · , wn|
∑
iwi =
1 and wi ≥ ǫ}. The Lagrange form is
1
2‖x−y
∗‖2−λ(
∑
i xi−1)−
∑
i βi(xi−ǫ).
From the KKT condition, we know that x∗i −y
∗
i −λ−βi = 0, βi ≥ 0, x
∗
i ≥ ǫ,
βi(x
∗
i − ǫ) = 0 and
∑
i x
∗
i = 1. From the construction of ν(p
∗,w∗), we know
that
∑
i y
∗
i = 1 =
∑
i x
∗
i . Since for the KKT condition x
∗
i − y
∗
i − λ− βi = 0,
by summing over all i, we have λ = − 1
n
∑
i βi ≤ 0. If x
∗
i = ǫ then the result
follows. Otherwise, βi = 0, which implies x
∗
i = y
∗
i + λ ≤ y
∗
i .
Claim 4.12. Let p ∈ P(w) be a Pareto Efficient allocation. Suppose that
wj ≤ ρwi, where
ρ =
1
2
min
i,j,s
ui(A
(s)
i
)<ui(A
(s)
j
) and
uj(A
(s)
i
)<uj(A
(s)
j
)
ui(A
(s)
j )− ui(A
(s)
i )
uj(A
(s)
j )− uj(A
(s)
i )
.
Then player i will not envy player j
Proof. Consider A(w) defined in Claim 4.2. Suppose that for any allocation
in this set, player i does not envy player j. Then player i will not envy player
j in the mixed allocation p ∈ P(w). We show by contradiction that for any
allocation in this set, player i will not envy player j. Suppose player i envies
player j in an allocation A(s). Then, since s ∈ A(w) and the allocation set
is swappable,
wiui(A
(s)
i ) + wjuj(A
(s)
j ) ≥ wiui(A
(s)
j ) + wjuj(A
(s)
i ). (1)
Since player i envies player j,
ui(A
(s)
i ) < ui(A
(s)
j ). (2)
From (1) and (2),
uj(A
(s)
i ) < uj(A
(s)
j ).
Since 0 < wj ≤ ρwi and from (1),
ρ(uj(A
(s)
j )− uj(A
(s)
i )) ≥ ui(A
(s)
j )− ui(A
(s)
i ),
which contradicts the definition of ρ.
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Claim 4.13. Given p∗ ∈ P(w), if ǫ < ρ
n
n
, then there exists a player i such
that wi > ǫ and i ∈ I(p
∗).
Proof. Since ǫ < ρ
n
n
, there exists an ξ such that 1
n
> ξ > ǫ and, for each
i, wi is not in the interval between ξ and
ξ
ρ
. Therefore, we can divide all
the players into two sets D = {i|wi < ξ} and U = {i|wi >
ξ
ρ
}. Note that
D ∩ U = ∅, D ∪ U = {1, 2, · · · , n}, and U is not empty since there exists
one player i with wi ≥
1
n
. By Claim 4.12, we know that players in U will
not envy players in D, and we know that from Claim 4.8, the envy graph is
acyclic, so the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Since ν(p∗,w∗) is not inW , then maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
) 6=
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i ) for some i. So p
∗ is not an envy-free allocation, which implies
that for i ∈ I(p∗),
maxi¯
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i¯
)
∑
i′ maxi¯
∑
j pjui′(A
(j)
i¯
)
<
∑
j pjui(A
(j)
i )
∑
i′
∑
j pjui′(A
(j)
i′ )
. (3)
From Claim 4.13, we know that there exists one player i∗ ∈ I(p∗) with
w∗i∗ > ǫ. Therefore, by (3), νi∗(p
∗,w∗) < w∗i∗ . By Claim 4.11, ̟i∗(p
∗,w∗) ≤
max{νi∗(p
∗,w∗), ǫ} < w∗i∗ , the result follows.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we showed that for any utility functions, a Pareto Efficient
and envy-free allocation always exists if the allocation set is swappable. It
needs to be noted that for the divisible case, the problem still remains open.
Our proof cannot be simply generalized to the divisible case. This is because
our ǫ will tend to 0 as ρ tends to 0, in which case P(w) will no longer ensure
Pareto Efficiency as for some i, wi = 0.
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